fall of the year; it was in the fall that the usual seasonal strain, added to an unusual credit and currency stringency, became the last straw that broke the camel's back.
This article investigates a recent claim by Miron (1986) that the reappearance of financial crises in 1929 was caused by a reduction in the Fed's accommodation of seasonal currency and credit demands! The following three types of evidence are examined: the Fed's procedures for supplying currency and bank reserves across seasons, the stability of the seasonal behavior of the Fed's policy tools and the seasonal behavior of market interest rates. The Fed's accommodation of seasonal demands was passive, suggesting that a deliberate change in seasonal policy was unlikely. Statistical analysis of the seasonal patterns of the Fed's policy tools and of market outcomes suggests further that no change in seasonal policy occurred. The Federal Reserve may rightly be criticized for failing to offset dramatic nonseasonal increases in currency and reserve demand during the Depression. It appears unlikely, however, that the financial crises were caused by a change in the System's seasonal policies.
The first sections of this article discuss the objectives of the Fed's founders, particularly with regard to seasonal accommodation, and describe how Fed officials implemented those objectives. A review of how the Fed's presence affected the seasonal pattern of interest rates and the frequency of financial crises follows. Finally the article examines whether a change in seasonal policy was a likely cause of the reappearance of crises in t929, first focusing on the Fed's procedures and then on statistical evidence pertaining to the seasonal patterns of Fed tools and market outcomes. The Federal Reserve was founded to correct banking system flaws that reformers believed contributed to financial crises. The National Banking era, which began with the National Bank Act of 1863 and ended with the opening of the Federal Reserve Banks in November 1914, was marked by recurrent crises. Often a crisis was touched off by a sudden international gold outflow or the failure of a major financial institution. Occasionally such an event triggered a general run by bank depositors seeking to convert deposits into currency. In extreme cases, banks were forced to suspend currency payrnents and call loans to protect their reserves. National Banking era crises were generally characterized by high interest rates, many bank failures, and a slowing of economic activity.' Studies of financial crises during the National Banking era noted that crises generally occurred at times of the year when demands for currency and credit reached seasonal peaks. In his study for the National Monetary Commission, Kemmerer (1910, pp. 222-23) wrote the following:
It has been found that the two periods of the year in which the money market is most likely to be strained are the periods of the 'spring revival,' about March, April, and early May, and that of the crop-moving demand in the fall; and that the two periods of easiest money market are the 'readjustment' period, extending from about the middle of January to nearly the 1st of March, and the period of the summer depression, extending through the three summer months. Of the eight panics [of the era], four occurred in the fall or early winter ... and these four included two of the three really severe panics of the period (i.e., those of 1873 and 1907); three occurred in May ... and one, probably the least important, ... extended from March until well along in November.
The evidence accordingly points to a tendency for panics to occur during the seasons normally characterized by stringent money markets. This does not mean that the seasonal stringencies are the causes of the panics; it does mean that the months in which they occur are the weakest links in the seasonal chain, and that in periods of extraordinary tension the chain breaks at these links.
Reformers attributed the crises of the National Banking era to inelasticity in the nation's currency supply. National bank notes, U.S. government currency issued during the Civil War (Greenbacks), silver certificates and specie (gold coin) were the principal currency forms during the National Banking era. Federally chartered (national) banks were permitted to issue notes valued at up to 90% (later 100%) of the face value of U.S. government bonds they pledged with the Comptroller of the Currency. The supply of national bank notes was thus tied to the volume of government bonds outstanding and the profits national banks could earn issuing notes using these bonds as security. The sup-3 There is no generally accepted definition of financial crisis.
Rather than defining the term, researchers often list characteristics of financial crises (for example, Bordo, 1986) . According to Schwartz (1986, p. Ii) , "A financial crisis is fueled by fears that means of payment will be unobtainable at any price and, in a fractional-reserve banking system, leads to a scramble for high-powered money. It is precipitated by actions of the public that suddenly squeeze the reserves of the banking system. In a futile attempt to restore reserves, the banks may call loans, refuse to roll over existing loans, or resort to selling assets." Schwartz distinguishes between real crises, in which financial distress leads to a sudden decline in the money supply, and pseudo-crises, which do not have money supply consequences. Kindleberger (1989) , however, argues against such a distinction. This article uses the terms crisis and panic interchangeably. See Sprague (1910) for an overview of financial crises during the National Banking era and Dwyer and Gilbert (1989) for a study of the effects of banking panics in this era.
plies of Greenbacks and silver certificates were fixed, as was the supply of specie for short periods. The currency supply was thus relatively inflexible and could not be increased sufficiently to accommodate a sudden large-scale attempt by depositors to convert funds into cash. A means of supplying large amounts of currency rapidly was key to most banking reform proposals.R eformers proposed a system in which the supplies of currency and credit fluctuated with the needs of trade. The theoretical justification for such a system became known as the Real Bills Doctrine, and that doctrine was implemented with passage of the Federal Reserve Act.
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The title of the Federal Reserve Act states that one purpose of the Federal Reserve System is "to furnish an elastic currency." Member commercial banks were required to hold reserve deposits with the Federal Reserve Banks instead of holding specie or deposits with Central Reserve City and Reserve City banks, as they had under the National Banking System. The Federal Reserve Act also provided for a new currency form-the Federal Reserve note. W. Randolph Burgess (1936, p. 150) , a long-time official at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, argued the following:
The fundamental change which the Federal Reserve System has made ... is to shift much of the burden of meeting the fluctuations in the demand for credit from the reserves of the member banks in New York City to the twelve Reserve Banks, which through the strength of their holding of pooled reserves and through their power of note issue and deposit expansion can provide almost any extra funds required.
A member commercial bank could accommodate an increase in loan demand or currency withdrawals by rediscounting eligible commercial paper with its Federal Reserve Bank. The Federal Reserve Bank would provide the commercial bank with reserves or currency and charge its discount rate.'
The provision of currency and reserves by the Federal Reserve Banks was intended to be largely automatic and self-regulating. Proponents of the Real Bills Doctrine believed that the quantities of currency and reserves provided by the Fed would be sufficient but not inflationary if supplied on the basis of short-term commercial loans.~The Federal Reserve Banks were authorized to rediscount commercial, agricultural and industrial paper, bankers acceptances used to finance foreign trade, and U.S. government securities with maturities of up to three months. Consistent with the Real Bills Doctrine, Federal Reserve Banks were not authorized to rediscount loans used to support purely financial activity, such as stock market call loans, because they were believed to be inflationary or speculative.' The Federal Reserve Banks set discount rates, subject to approval by the Federal Reserve Board, and generally supplied currency and reserves elastically through the discount window. The Federal Reserve Banks also supplied reserves by purchasing bankers acceptances outright. They set buying rates and purchased all acceptances that met minimum quality standards, thus supplying reserves freely at the buying rates.
Besides setting discount and acceptance buying rates, the Federal Reserve Banks were permitted to buy and sell U.S. government securities. The Fed's founders did not envision use of this authorization to conduct monetary policy as we 'A variety of currency substitutes were used during the banking panics of the National Banking era. Loan certificates issued by clearinghouses have been the most studied (see Dewald (1972] , Timberlake (1984] , Gorton 11985] , and Dwyer and Gilbert (1989] ). The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 permitted bank associations to issue 'emergency currency" during panics, which in essence made legal the earlier practice of issuing clearinghouse certificates. 'See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 168-73) , West (1977) or Timberlake (1978, pp. 186-206) for discussions of the reform movement and analysis of various proposals. 'The title of The Federal Reserve Act reads, "An Act to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes?' 'This action was originally known as rediscounting because commercial bank loans were often made on a discount basis; hence when they were endorsed by a commercial bank and sent to a Federal Reserve Bank, they were rediscounted by the Fed. 'Because the Fed was required to maintain gold reserves equal to a fraction of its deposit and note liabilities, the gold standard ultimately constrained the growth of reserves and currency. In practice, however the Fed maintained excess gold reserves, so the reserve requirement had little effect on its operations before 1931. 'Eligibility requirements were somewhat broadened in 1916 to include acceptances arising from domestic trade, and Federal Reserve Banks were authorized to lend directly to member banks on their own notes secured by eligible paper. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp. 325-26) for a summary of the types of paper eligible for rediscount and for significant changes in eligibility rules from 1914 to 1933. In accommodating the demands of commercial banks, Federal Reserve credit tended to increase in the spring and autumn months, when commercial loan demand peaked, and again in December, with increased holiday demand for currency. After the holidays, currency returned to banks and credit demand declined as it did during the summer. Federal Reserve credit tended to decline in winter and summer months.
After the Fed's establishment, the behavior of short-term interest rates changed dramatically. Before 1914, rates had a distinct seasonal pattern-high in the autumn and during the winter and summer. Burgess (1936, p. 204): (M)oney rates fluctuated much more rapidly and widely before the Federal Reserve System was established. -. -In January and February money tended to be easy. In the early spring rates rose, as the demand for funds increased with the planting of crops and spring trade. Towards summer rates fell, but rose again to the year's high point in the autumn with harvesting and autumn trade. They continued generally high throughout the holiday period with its heavy currency requirements. --Since the establishment of the Reserve System, such seasonal swings of interest rates have been almost though not quite eliminated.
Burgess (p. 206) goes on to write, "The explanation of the change which has taken place is found largely in the credit elasticity provided by the Reserve System." Other writers have recognized the Fed's influence on the pattern of rates, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 292-93) , for example, conclude the following:
't'he Federal Reserve 'sterilized,' as it were, seasonal withdrawals and returns of currency and thereby kept deposits of member banks at 10 5ee Chandler (1958) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Wicker (1966) and Wheelock (1991 Wheelock ( , 1992 for discussion of the evolution of monetary policy and the Fed's objectives during the 1920s and early 1930s. the Reserve Banks largely, though not entirely, free of seasonal movements. The effect was to change the pre-1914 seasonal patterns notably, 'The seasonal pattern in currency outside the Treasury was widened, the seasonal pattern in call money rates narrowed. The System was almost entirely successful in the stated objective of eliminating seasonal strain.
'Fhe contribution the Federal Reserve made to accommodating seasonal (and nonseasonal) currency detnands is illustrated in figure 1 ." Federal Reserve credit and currency in circulation tended to move together, Federal Reserve credit is a source of bank reserves, so by extending Fed credit when currency was withdrawn from banks, the Fed reduced fluctuations in member bank reserves. 12 'l'he seasonal pattern of interest rates changed after the Fed opened in November 1914, Figure   2 shows the estimated seasonal patterns of the call loan renewal interest rate between January 1890 and October 1914 and between November 1914 and December 1933 In the earlier period the interest rate fluctuated much more widely during the year than it did after the Fed's founding. Many studies, using a variety of statistical techniques, confirm the apparent decrease in seasonal amplitude illustrated here.14 Scholars debate whether the Federal Reserve was respon-
The data plotted in figure 1 are monthly averages of daily figures. The source for these data is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp. 369-71) , l2As discussed later, this study begins its analysis in 1919 because there is controversy about the Fed's effects in its early years and because of the disruptions caused by the Fed's contribution to financing World War I.
"The plotted seasonal patterns are simply the monthly averages of the rate less the annual mean, after subtracting a time trend-The patterns are calculated from a linear regression of the interest rate on monthly dummy variables and a time trend, which included an AR(2) error process and was estimated using maximum likelihood, It might be argued that it would be more appropriate to examine the behavior of real interest rates because the underlying sources of seasonal credit and currency demands are real phenomena. Miron (1986) argues, however, that nominal rates should reflect the extent of the Fed's seasonal accommodation, and most studies have focused exclusively on the behavior of nominal rates. 14 See Shiller (1980) , Clark (1986) , Miron (1986) , Mankiw, Miron, and Well (1987) , Fishe and Wohar (1990) , Canova (1991) , Fishe (1991) , and Holland and Toma (1991) . (1914, p. 17) indicates: "The more complete adaptation of the credit mechanism and facilities of the country to the needs of industry, commerce, and agriculture-with all their seasonal fluctuations and contingencies-should be the constant aim of a Reserve Bank's management." In the following passage Burgess (1927, p. 122) noted that Fed operations apparently eliminated financial panics:
In the old days there were rigid and not far distant limits to the reserves available; now the mechanism of the Reserve System provides for a much larger possible expansion. It gives much greater elasticity ----This elasticity results in much more stability of rates and practically eliminates the fear of money panicBurgess argued further that, "The presence of the Reserve System gives greater elasticity to the supply of funds and stability to the money market and removes the fear of money panics" (p. 125)17 Miron (1986, p. 136) Trescott (1982) and Hamilton (1987) , also conclude that nionetary policy changed significantly with, or just before, the onset of the Depression." The remainder of this article examines whether there was a change in Federal Reserve accommodation of seasonal currency and credit demands that could explain the reappearance of financial crises beginning in October 1929, How did the Federal Reserve accommodate seasonal currency and credit demands during the Great Depression? A review of the Fed's methods indicates that the Fed was largely passive in this accommodation, suggesting that any apparent change in the seasonal pattern of Federal Reserve credit was more likely due to changes in demand than to a deliberate policy decision, "Miron (1986) and Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) Wheelock (1991 Wheelock ( , 1992 ,
Figure 3 Federal Reserve Discount and Acceptance Buying Rates
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The Fed had the following three main policy tools during the 1920s and early 1930s: the discount rate, the acceptance buying rate and open market operations in U.S. government securities," The Fed was established to provide currency and bank reserves to accommodate the needs of commerce. By specifying eligibility requirements for the paper that could be rediscounted or purchased, the Fed's founders intended to limit policymakers' discretion, as well as to accommodate currency and credit demands without fueling inflation or speculation.
Only in open market operations in government securities did the Fed determine the specific volume of its operations. The Fed was generally passive in supplying currency and bank reserves through the discount window and by purchasing acceptances.
2°T he Federal
Reserve could of course affect the volume of discount loans and acceptance purchases by altering the discount and acceptance buying rates, but neither rate had a seasonal pattern (see figure 3) 24 The figure plots the estimated dummy coefficient for each month less the average of the 12 estimated coefficients. In addition to the dummy variables, the model includes a time trend and an AR(2) error process (which was suggested by standard model selection criterion) and was estimated using maximum likelihood. 25 Model selection criterion suggested the use of an AR (2) The results of further tests for a change in are, however, not statisliially significant.29 Thus the Fed's seasonal accommodation are presented these data do not support the hypothesis that in table 2 and table 3. Table 2 ject to large and erratic fluctuations during the change tn the Fed s acceptance holdings, these Great Depression (see figure 1) . In particular, a tests indicate no change in seasonal patterns. 27 pronounced change in its behavior appears to -have occurred in late 1931, suggesting that in- Table 3 reports the standard deviations of the
ferences drawn from analysis of Fed credit over monthly dummy coefficients for each variable . , . .
the entire 1929-33 period might be misleading. in each period.28 Miron (1988) concluded that the Fed was less accommodative during the On September 21, 1931, Great Britain stopped Depression in part because the standard deviaconverting pounds sterling into gold. Fears that tion of the seasonal pattern of Fed credit was the United States would soon follow Britain off smaller between 1929 and 1933 than it had the gold standard led to a large withdrawal of been between 1922 and 1928. Although comparforeign deposits from U.S. banks and a conseing the standard deviations of the seasonal patquent gold outflow. The U.S. monetary gold terns is not a statistically rigorous test, it does stock declined 15 percent in the six weeks after provide evidence that the seasonal variability of Britain's action.'°Domestic depositors also each series increased or decreased over time.
panicked and converted deposits into currency. The standard deviation of the seasonal coeffiMember banks partially offset the reserve cients for Fed credit and each component is drains caused by the gold and currency outlarger for the Depression years than it had flows by selling acceptances to the Fed and by been between 1919 and 1928. The differences borrowing at the discount window. Federal 27 1f December 1927 is used as the breakpoint, the results "The standard deviations for 1928-33 are also larger than are identical to those reported in table 2, except that the those for 1919-27, but the differences are again not statistifirst difference of the Fed's acceptance holdings had a stacally significant. The specific test employed is a Wald test ble seasonal pattern, of the equality of the variances of the monthly dummy '°Theseare simply the standard deviations of the point esticoefficients across the two periods. I thank Joe Ritter for mates of the seasonal dummy coefficients and should not suggesting this test. be confused with the standard errors of the coefficient es- Table 5 reports tests of the stability of the seasonal patterns of each interest rate. Although "Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, p. 386) . "The Fed argued that it lacked sufficient gold reserves to purchase government securities in sufficient quantities to prevent reserves from declining. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend that the Fed did have sufficient reserves and in any event had the authority to suspend its reserve requirement temporarily. Wicker (1966) , however, argues that Fed officials feared that security purchases would indicate an unwillingness to defend the dollar's value and exacerbate the gold outflow. See Wheelock (1991 Wheelock ( , 1992 To put the possible increase in the seasonal pattern of interest rates during the Depression in perspective, figure 6 plots the estimated coefficients on the monthly dummy variables for the call loan renewal rate between 1919 and 1928 and between 1929 and 1933 . I use the same scale as in figure 2, where these coefficients are plotted for the 1890-1914 and 1914-33 periods. Comparison of the two figures shows that the increase in the seasonal amplitude of the call loan rate during the Depression was small relative to the decline in amplitude in 1914." For comparison, the standard deviation of the seasonal pattern of the call loan rate between January 1890 and October 1914 is 1.02 (0.67 for the first difference of the call loan rate). For the November 1914-December 1933 period the standard deviation is 0.16 (0.13 for the first difference). The increases in the standard deviations after December 1928 are thus quite small in comparison with the size of the changes in November 1914. The levels of the standard deviations during the Depression are also small in comparison with those in the pre-November 1914 period.'~The various evidence that interest rates were more seasonal during the Depression is ambiguous. The possible increase in the seasonal pattern of interest rates after 1929, however, seems too small to conclude that unaccommodated seasonal currency and credit demands caused the return of financial crises during the Depression.
Proponents of banking reform in the United States in the early 20th century noted that financial crises tended to occur in months when currency and credit demands reached seasonal peaks. Eliminating crises was a principal goal of the founders of the Federal Reserve System, and they designed methods of accommodating The reappearance of financial crises during the Great Depression suggests the possibility that the Fed accommodated seasonal currency and credit demands less in those years than it had between 1914 and 1928. This article shows, however, that the Fed's accommodation of seasonal demands was generally passive, occurring mainly through discount loans and acceptance purchases. 'there was no seasonal pattern in the Fed's discount and acceptance buying rates. Commercial banks initiated most seasonal extensions of Fed credit, suggesting that changes in demand, rather than deliberate policy decisions, caused any apparent changes in the seasonal pattern of Fed credit. In addition, Federal Reserve credit and its components do not appear to have been less seasonal during the Depression, at least not before September 1931, than they had been during the 1920s. And although the seasonal pattern of interest rates during the Great Depression may have increased slightly, the seasonal fluctuations remained trivial compared with those that occurred before 1914. The Fed's failure to prevent banking panics and declines in bank reserves and the money supply during the Great Depression was a serious error. It appears unlikely, however, that the financial crises of the Great Depression were caused by a change in the seasonal policies of the Federal Reserve System.
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